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Abstract This paper reviews the progress economists have made towards
achieving an evidence-based educational policy, and highlights challenges that
remain. The five main findings are: (1) over the past two decades, much effort has
gone into identifying the causal effects of school inputs; this work has produced
results and should be expanded. (2) That said, particularly when it originates in
small-scale experiments, such work is unlikely to produce a full road map for an
evidence-based education policy. (3) There has been less work on the effects of
educational inputs at the pre-school stage, and this may be a greater constraint to
sound policy than at first appears. (4) There has also been progress on understanding
the effects of incentives within education. (5) There is relatively less work sur-
rounding the effects of inputs provided by parents and students, both in terms of
resources and effort.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen increasing calls for evidence-based education policies. In
fact, academic researchers have been on a quest for such policies for decades—at
least since the publication of the Coleman Report on the equality of educational
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opportunity (Coleman et al. 1966).1 This paper reviews some of the significant
contributions economists have made in the area of evidence-based education
policies. It also argues that this quest is incomplete, and identifies substantial
knowledge gaps, some of which are unlikely to be filled based on the current trends.
Two notes on the focus of the paper are relevant. First, in keeping with this
volume, the discussion emphasizes Latin America, although the evidence comes
from, and the conclusions are meant to apply to, countries in other regions and with
diverse income levels. Second, the focus is on assessing the skills that individuals
gain in educational systems before they enter the labor market; less attention is
placed on the performance of systems in terms of increasing enrollment. This
focus—which Sect. 2 justifies in more detail—is based on the fact that in Latin
America, as in other developing regions, much greater strides have been made in
increasing enrollment. In addition, the region performs at or above what its income
levels might suggest in terms of enrollment, but lags in terms of measures of skills
such as test scores.2
The paper begins by setting out a conceptual framework that serves to organize
past work and identify remaining gaps. It then considers the evidence, with five
main conclusions:
1. Over the past two decades, much effort has gone into identifying the causal
effects of school inputs. As Banerjee (2007) suggests, this trend reflects a
substantial effort by economists to ‘‘get into the machine’’—that is, to study
schools in detail and understand the educational production function. The
growth in this type of research is a salutary trend, as in many countries the
implementation of many if not most educational interventions still goes
unevaluated. It follows that this type of research should be expanded, even if it
means that some education economists must go further into the machine. For
example, work on the effectiveness of different types of curricula—a topic far
afield from most economists’ training—could not only be quite productive but
also seem to be a logical extension of current work.
2. That said, work that is primarily focused on identifying the causal effects of
different inputs and interventions—particularly when it originates in small-scale
experiments—is unlikely to produce a full road map for an evidence-based
education policy. Specifically, the sometimes explicit promise of this work has
been to generate a ranking of inputs and interventions in terms of cost-
effectiveness, with the rationale that such rankings will one day guide policy
throughout the developing world (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). For reasons discussed
below, however, such rankings are unlikely to be stable across or even within
countries—they may vary with the setting and/or scale of implementation, for
instance. This also suggests some caution in implementation.
3. There has been less work on the effects of educational inputs during the
preschool stage. The relative scarcity of such work may be a greater constraint
1 See Rockoff (2009) for a review of systematic, if isolated, research efforts from the 1920s and 1930s.
2 There is consensus around this diagnosis. For a thorough review see Vegas and Petrow (2008). See also
Behrman and Birdsall (1983).
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to sound policy recommendations than at first appears. For example, if
educational investments made early in life affect the productivity of
investments made later (Cunha and Heckman 2007)—and this remains to be
fully shown—then an evidence-based educational policy will look more
complicated. In other words, it will have to take into account that part of the
return to preschool educational investments that may come in the form of
increasing the returns to educational investments during a later period (e.g.,
high school). In short, further work on the impact of preschool inputs is
desirable and may also help to improve policy beyond the preschool sphere.
4. There has been progress on understanding the effects of incentives within
education. For example, there has been significant work on the effects of
introducing competition in school systems. In general, the effects of voucher
and similar initiatives have not been nearly as robust or positive as most
economists expected. That said, recent research suggests progress toward
understanding how the design of policies introducing competition (e.g., school
vouchers) might be improved. In short, while caution in implementation is
desirable, further experimentation also seems warranted.
5. There is relatively less work surrounding the effects of inputs provided by
parents and students, both in terms of resources and effort. The key issue here is
to what extent parental and student effort matter, and how their level responds
to incentives. Parents are even harder for policymakers to control than school
administrators or teachers, so understanding incentives is critical. For example,
the return to skill in the labor market, or in admission to universities, may be
crucial in terms of determining parents’ and students’ attitudes toward skill
accumulation. The corollary is that the organization of the educational market,
and its relation with the labor market, may involve a broad set of institutions
that set up an educational system for either success or failure. If this is the case,
then understanding these incentives may be essential not only to school system
design but also to correctly exploiting all the knowledge gained from
experimentation. In short, while education economists might want to invest
energy ‘‘getting into the machine’’, they should not lose sight of the fact that
broad institutions/incentives may matter (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
The next section lays out a basic conceptual framework. Sections 3–6, then
review research and derive the implications discussed above, and Sect. 7 puts forth
conclusions.
2 A focus on skills
This section provides some brief background onwhy this paper focuses on interventions
aimed at raising skills rather than interventions aimed at raising enrollment.
Along an enrollment dimension, the educational systems of Latin American
countries are not underperformers, at least in a relative sense. Enrollment rates in
the region are relatively high when one controls for income levels. Figure 1
illustrates this by plotting primary enrollment rates by GDP in 2005. Enrollment
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rates for Latin American countries are at or above levels one would expect given
incomes.
Although the result is less stark, the same holds for secondary (Fig. 2) and pre-
primary (Fig. 3) enrollment rates.
Further, enrollment rates have been improving over time, and many if not most
countries in the region have devoted substantial resources to achieve further
improvements via conditional cash transfer programs. These programs have been
credibly shown to increase enrollment. In short, this dimension has seen
improvements, is likely to see more, and has not suffered from a lack of fresh
resources.
The situation is quite different, however, in terms of skills, at least as measured
by test scores. For instance, Fig. 4, drawn from Vegas and Petrow (2008), illustrates
that in the 2003 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) math test, not
only was Latin American performance low, it was also lower given what a linear
prediction based on GDP per capita would suggest.
To provide a more qualitative sense of the situation, LLECE (2001) considered
the percentage of public and private school children who attain different levels of
reading readiness.3 Roughly, Level 1 refers to a basic literal understanding of
texts—such as being able to identify the actors in a simple plot. Level 2 is the ability
to not only understand a text but to express its basic elements in words different
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Fig. 1 Primary enrollment and per capita income (PPP), 2005. Source: based on data from the UNESCO
Institute for statistics, http://stats.uis.unesco.org. Accessed on 1 May 2015. PPP purchasing power parity
3 LLECE stands for ‘‘Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Evaluacion de la Calidad de la Educacion’’.
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Fig. 2 Secondary enrollment and per capita income (PPP), 2005. Source: based on data from the
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blanks’’ in a text regarding aspects such as assumptions and causation. The majority
of 3rd and 4th graders in the region have attained proficiency at Level 1, although
more than one in ten children are unable to meet this benchmark in all countries
save Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. By Level 3, more than half of children fail to
attend proficiency in all countries, except Argentina and Chile. Thus, by this
objective standard, skills in Latin American are low.
There is less of a sense of how test scores have evolved historically, as time series
data on this dimension are harder to come by (although there is a clear upward trend
in self-reported literacy). In international testing, the region has not made progress,
with the recent exception of Chile. Beyond this, casual observation suggests that in
many countries more fresh public resources have been devoted to expanding
enrollment (e.g., conditional cash transfers have proliferated) than in serious
undertakings to improve the production of skills. In short, by both relative and
absolute measures, Latin American educational systems are producing low levels of
skills. This problem—and the serious challenges that addressing it present—
accounts for the fact that the remainder of this paper is devoted to this issue.
3 Framework
Suppose individuals accumulate skills over two periods, preschool and school.
These can be thought of as corresponding roughly to ages 0-5 and 6-18, and we
label them t = 1 and 2, respectively.
Fig. 4 Latin American performance in international tests. Source: Vegas and Petrow (2008)
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Assume that the skill, h, that individuals accumulate over these two periods, is a
function of:
• Their innate ability upon birth, denoted by a0. This is essentially a genetic draw,
and as its subscript suggests, it is exogenous in terms of decisions made in
periods 1 and 2.
• Their parents’ endowments, p0. For example, literate parents have an easier time
teaching their children how to read.
• Their parents’ investments in each period, pt. These investments can take the
form of activities (e.g., playing with a young child or helping a teenager with
homework) or expenditure on material inputs (e.g., supplying nutrition or a
home computer).
• The school-based investments they receive in each period, st. For example, in
period 1 some children will attend a preschool. In period 2, most children will
attend primary and perhaps secondary school. These investments may be funded
by parents (e.g., if the family pays for private schooling) or provided via public
subsidies (e.g., public schools or vouchers). Note that, like pt, st should be
thought of as a vector that includes many components, ranging from
infrastructure to effective teachers or curricular design.
• The individual effort, e2, that individuals exert during period 2. We assume that
in period 1 children are not conscious of making an effort to learn—this is not
essential—but that by primary or secondary school students realize that learning
may require trade-offs such as doing homework instead of playing or working.
More formally, skill at the end of period 1 is given by:
h1 ¼ f1 a0; p0; s1; p1ð Þ: ð1Þ
We will assume that all the arguments in Eq. (1)—except for a0 and p0—are
endogenous in the sense that they may respond to the level of the others. For
instance, parents may adjust the level of inputs they provide, p1, if the investment on
the part of schools, s1, changes. For a specific example, if their child receives
thorough reading instruction at school, parents might be less likely to provide it at
home (Das et al. 2013; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2013; Fredriksson et al. 2014).
Skill at the end of period 2 is given by:
h2 ¼ f2 h1; a0; p0; s2; p2; e2ð Þ: ð2Þ
The presence of h1 reflects that skills acquired in the preschool period may affect
the production of skills during primary or secondary school (Berlinski et al. 2008,
2009). Cunha and Heckman (2007) refer to this as self-productivity. Further, Eq. (2)
is a general expression and does not rule out that the level of any given argument
affects the impact that others have on skill. For example, children who have attained
a higher level of skill in the preschool period, h1, may be better positioned to benefit
from school inputs, s2, such as teacher instruction. These are dynamic comple-
mentarities, in the terminology of Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Cunha and
Heckman (2007).
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For a final ingredient, we suppose that parental investments, pt, can also depend
on returns, r, and the organization of the school system, o. For example, if parents
perceive that the accumulation of skills has a high return—say in terms of their
children eventually gaining admission into a selective university or securing high-
wage employment—they will be more willing to invest their time and money in
schooling. Similarly, the organization of the education system may affect parents’
investment choices. To illustrate, some European and African countries have school
systems structured such that not all children are entitled to the transition from
primary into academic secondary schools. Their entry, as the school and class to
which they are assigned, is contingent on testing performance. Similarly, some
countries (e.g., Brazil, Chile, and Turkey) rely largely on test-based admissions for
higher education. Parents may be more willing to pay for tutoring in such settings.
Assume also that at least some actors responsible for setting the level of school
investments, st, also respond to returns, r, and the organization of the school system,
o. For example, the effort teachers and administrators exert might not be
independent of the incentives they have (Friedman 1955; McMillan 2005; Reback
et al. 2014). Analogously, the organization of the school system itself might affect
their decisions. For example, Duflo et al. (2011) show that different degrees of
tracking may affect teachers’ effort or preferences. Finally, it can similarly be
assumed that the effort students exert may be a function of returns and
organization—that is, students also respond to incentives.
4 School inputs
The above discussion highlights that an evidence-based education policy requires
knowing how skills are determined by many ingredients. To discuss the state of
knowledge, we begin by looking at the set of ingredients—in the framework in
Sect. 2—that has received the most attention: the impact of school inputs, s2. This
will illustrate challenges that arise even when one restricts attention to a single
argument of Eqs. (1) or (2).
The interest in school inputs reflects the attention that economists give to
productive efficiency. Specifically, a standard policy question is: are resources in the
educational sector well allocated in terms of maximizing skills? This is a well-
defined question and its analysis can provide direct implications. Addressing it
requires researchers to address three challenges:
1. Obtaining data on school inputs and outcomes—in other words, measures of the
different elements of st and of some aspect of ht (e.g., test scores).
2. Ascertaining the causal effect of each element of st (i.e., estimating terms like
qh2/qs2)—in other words, this effect is the change in skill (qh2) induced by the
change in the amount of the school input (qs2), keeping all other factors
constant.
3. Obtaining information on the costs of each element of st (e.g., books or teacher
training).
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With these three elements, one can carry out cost–benefit comparisons and, based
on the result, reallocate budgets such that the ‘‘bang for the buck’’ is equalized
across inputs.4 At the simplest level, this would provide an evidence-based
education policy. The next three subsections review how researchers have tackled
each of these three challenges in recent decades. The remaining subsections address
complications and knowledge gaps.
4.1 Data availability
In its earliest stages, research on the impact of school inputs was held back by the
first challenge: data availability. There was little information on what inputs were
offered to different schools and children, and there were few available standardized
measures of skills. In the United States, this situation began to change noticeably
after the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966).
Since then, efforts to compile data have intensified and today even most low-
income countries collect at least some data on school resources and student
achievement. In addition, initiatives such as the PISA supply data that are
comparable across countries.5 Nonetheless, the sustained collection of data on skills
is one area where governments and multilateral agencies should remain vigilant.6
4.2 Causality
The second challenge to devising an evidence-based education policy—that related
to ascertain the causal effects of each input—is methodologically more complex,
and resources alone do not necessarily solve the problem. The basic problem is that
unobserved characteristics might influence both the levels of st and ht that
individuals display. For example, suppose one notices a significant correlation
between s2 and h2 (e.g., children in schools with low class sizes test well). If s2 is
correlated with p2—for example, parents willing to spend on small classes might
generally also be more motivated and willing to help with homework—it will be
difficult to determine if the better performance is due to the lower class sizes, as
opposed to greater parental involvement. In the econometric terminology, it will be
challenging to isolate or identify the causal effect of s2, qh2/qs2. If research cannot
achieve such identification, then no evidence-based policy on school inputs is
feasible.
It deserves explicit mention that this identification problem is not typically solved
by the use of statistical techniques such as multivariate regression, multi-level
models, or propensity score matching.7 However sophisticated, such techniques can
4 See Levin and McEwan (2001) for a thorough discussion on cost-effectiveness analyses.
5 The PISA is focused on high-income countries. For greater coverage in Latin America, see UNESCO’s
Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education testing initiative.
6 Bolivia is one example where efforts are not always sustained. By the mid-1990s Bolivia had
implemented achievement tests in a representative sample of primary schools, but those tests ceased in
the mid-2000s.
7 As the saying goes, statistical techniques solve statistical problems, they do not solve identification
problems.
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only work with variables actually observed, leaving open the door for unobserved
factors—such as parental motivation in the example above—to bias estimates.
The early literature, while producing numerous papers, rarely dealt squarely with
this fundamental identification problem.8 Specifically, the 1980s and 1990s saw the
publication of early meta-analyses and literature reviews (Hanushek 1986, 1995;
Fuller and Clarke 1994) that sought to provide a guide for policy. Although there
were debates (Hedges et al. 1994; Hanushek 1994) surrounding the validity of these
reviews, criticism rarely focused on what was actually a central constraint to their
usefulness: the quality of the available studies they reviewed in terms of isolating
causal effects. As emphasized in subsequent reviews (Krueger 2003; Glewwe and
Kremer 2006), inferences drawn from numerous biased estimates may of course still
be biased.
Since the early 1990s, research has made significant progress in dealing with the
challenge of causality. The two most common approaches used for this purpose
have been randomized evaluations and regression discontinuity designs.9 Random-
ized control trials work by randomly assigning individuals or schools to treatment
and control groups. The treatment group receives an educational input, st, while the
control group does not. Random assignment generally ensures that the two groups
are similar along all dimensions, including unobservable characteristics such as
parental motivation. Because the only difference between the treatment and control
group is that the former receives an input while the latter does not, then any
difference in their outcomes can be attributed to this input.10
The regression discontinuity design aims for an analogous result. In this case, the
treatment is not randomly assigned but rather depends on a ‘‘running variable’’. For
example, schools with average student incomes below a certain threshold might
receive a school input—say, a school library—whereas schools with incomes above
this threshold do not. The intuition is that while wealthier schools on average are
different from low-income schools, very close to the threshold that determines
treatment, they should be similar. For example, if the threshold were the 50th
percentile of income, then one might compare schools with income at the 49th
percentile with those at the 50th percentile. By construction, these two groups of
schools are very similar in terms of income. Under the assumption that they also are
similar along dimensions including unobservable characteristics such as parental
8 However, there certainly were exceptions. For example, Rockoff (2009) reviews rigorous studies on
class size from the 1920s and 1930s. Although this research was not always on a large scale or
sophisticated by modern standards, it did aim to produce causal estimates.
9 The renewed emphasis on these techniques was part of a broader effort by applied economists, often
working in areas related to labor and education, to produce causal evidence (Card and Krueger 1992;
Meyer 2005; Angrist and Lavy 1999; Hoxby 2000; Kremer and Miguel 2004; Duflo 2001). Both
randomization and regression discontinuity had been applied to education topics since much earlier in the
20th century. Rockoff (2009) reviews work from the 1920s applying randomization to class size, and the
regression discontinuity method dates to Thistlewaite and Campbell (1960), who analyzed the effect of
scholarships.
10 For further background see Banerjee and Duflo (2008).
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motivation, then any difference in their outcomes can be attributed to the school
input under study.11
These approaches have permitted arguably causal estimates of the impact of
numerous educational inputs, including:
• Class size (Angrist and Lavy 1999; Krueger 1999; Urquiola 2006; Banerjee
et al. 2007; Duflo et al. 2011; Fredriksson et al. 2012)
• Classroom libraries (Abeberese et al. 2012)
• Computers and computer-aided instruction (Linden 2008; Barrera and Linden
2009; He et al. 2009; Cristia et al. 2012; Malamud and Pop-Eleches 2011; Mo
et al. 2012)
• Flashcards (He et al. 2009)
• Flipcharts (Glewwe et al. 2004)
• Lump-sum grants to schools (Pradhan et al. 2013; Das et al. 2013; Blimpo et al.
2011)
• Textbooks (Glewwe et al. 2004; Jamison et al. 1981)
• Tutoring or remedial instruction (Banerjee et al. 2007; Chay et al. 2005)
• Tutoring software (Linden 2008).
The above list is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, Glewwe (2002)
provides more detail and McEwan (2013) presents an update on randomized
evaluations and features a meta-analysis.12 In particular, McEwan (2013) classifies
interventions that have been evaluated via randomized control trials according to the
magnitude of their impact on test scores. His summary covers not just school inputs
but other types of interventions covered below. We include all of them in the
following list for completeness, and then refer back to them:
• Close to zero and statistically insignificant effects: monetary grants and
deworming.
• Small mean effect sizes that are not always robust to controls: providing
information to parents and improving school management and supervision.
• Larger effect sizes (in ascending order of estimated impact): instructional
materials, computers or instructional technology, teacher training, smaller
classes, smaller learning groups within classes, ability grouping (tracking),
student and teacher performance incentives, and contract or volunteer teachers.
4.3 Costs and cost-effectiveness
A third challenge to devising an evidence-based policy in the case of school inputs
is to have cost information that renders cost-effectiveness comparisons feasible.
Intuitively, for every element in the vector st (e.g., class size), one asks what the
11 For more background see Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). For discussions
on complications see McCrary (2008) and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009).
12 See also Muralidharan (2013) for a review focused on India.
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:12 Page 11 of 30 12
123
causal contribution to skill is. These contributions can be compared to their costs,
and resources reallocated across inputs until the ‘‘bang for the buck’’ is equalized
across inputs. An example of this is provided by Banerjee et al. (2007), who show
that while computer-assisted instruction improves learning twice as much as a
remedial teacher, the latter is significantly cheaper, and so is still a better
investment.
4.4 Bringing it all together
The above discussion shows that the literature has made significant progress in
terms of producing information on the impact of school inputs. It is clearly desirable
that such work continues and be expanded. In many countries, expensive school
input initiatives are still implemented without evaluation. In some cases, these may
have very small or even negative effects, and finding out as much is obviously
useful.
At the same time, the promise of this type of work has been to guide the choice of
education inputs. In a salient example, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) consider a number of
interventions that might increase enrollment. Thus, their emphasis is on enrollment
rather than skills, but nonetheless a discussion of their paper is useful. Specifically,
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) draw on the evaluations done by MIT’s Abdul Latif Jameel
Poverty Action Lab, along with data on the costs of these interventions. They can
thus present cost-benefit comparisons that explicitly aim to guide the allocation of
an educational budget—indeed; the publication is more along the lines of a policy
brief than an academic paper. To cite one result, the authors suggest that
expenditure on deworming is much more cost-effective than that on conditional
cash transfers. This paper thus illustrates the thrust of much of the research on
school inputs and, therefore, provides a useful setting in which to consider some of
the challenges to this type of work.
4.5 Remaining challenges
4.5.1 External validity
A first, relatively well-understood challenge concerns external validity. Specifically,
it might be that the impact of a given school input in one setting does not necessarily
generalize well to other settings—initial conditions or institutional setups may
matter. For example, deworming and conditional cash transfers are unlikely to have
large effects on attainment in areas with low prevalence of worm infections or
relatively high enrollment rates.
A related challenge is that comparisons across different contexts will be more
complicated for some educational outcomes. For example, even if a certain input is
found to generate a 0.25 standard deviation gain in a certain test in a certain country,
it is difficult to determine what that would be equivalent to elsewhere. Tests are
often administered at different levels in different countries, and there may be
variation across settings regarding the impact of test score gains on, for example,
wages.
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The evidence in McEwan (2013) shows that these issues may be particularly
challenging in terms of using existing research to construct an evidence-based
policy for Latin America. The vast majority of experimentation has taken place in
other settings, and in the extreme the literature may lead one to use parameters that
do not apply well to the region.
4.5.2 Behavioral responses and equilibrium effects13
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) suggest a different complication in basing policy
on cost-effectiveness comparisons.14 Specifically, they suggest that behavioral
responses and equilibrium effects may render cost-effectiveness rankings such as
those in Dhaliwal et al. (2011) unstable, even within a given country. The
complication is that a ranking based on generally small-scale, short-lived
experiments might not be an accurate guide to the ranking that would emerge if
it was derived from interventions implemented on a large-scale and sustained basis.
To illustrate this point, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) start from the
observation that while families cannot completely control the inputs their children
receive at school, s2, they can influence their level. For example, parents in Latin
America often pay for private schools with smaller class sizes. Even parents who do
not use private schools can endeavor to get their children enrolled at (often
oversubscribed) publicly subsidized Catholic schools that might, for example, offer
different teacher effectiveness than regular public schools. Let s*2 denote the level
of school inputs that households target by such actions. Assume it is a function of
endowments, returns, and levels of skill that children acquired in the preschool
period:
s2 h1; a0; p0; r; oð Þ: ð3Þ
Schools in turn make decisions on how to allocate resources to students. For
example, they might have policies that assign smaller classes or less-experienced
teachers to weaker students. Formally, suppose they also condition the inputs
children receive on their preschool achievement and endowments, and on returns:
s2 h1; a0; p0; r; oð Þ: ð4Þ
The deviation between the investments in children actually receives at school and
the level their parents targeted for them is, therefore, s2 - s*2. As stated in Sect. 2,
parents can react to what they observe in school in setting their own input levels. For
instance, parents will know if their child made it into the nontuition-charging
Catholic school they desired before they have to help with homework that school
year. For period 2, parental inputs are, therefore, given by:
13 This section draws on Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013). The concepts discussed go back at least
to the work of the Cowles Commission in the 1950s. See Heckman (2000) for further background.
14 See also the evidence in Das et al. (2013), Beasley and Huillery (2013), and Fredriksson et al. (2014).
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p2 h1; a0; p0; s2s2; r; oð Þ:
Now note that experimental and regression discontinuity analyses try to ascertain
the effect of exogenously changing one element of s2—say class size—while
holding all other inputs constant. That is, they aim to estimate terms such as:
oh2=o s2  s2ð Þ ¼ oh2=os2 ¼ of2=os2: ð5Þ
A first point to note, as emphasized by Todd and Wolpin (2003), is that the ‘‘reduced
form’’ effects estimated by experiments may more typically also reflect changes in
inputs provided by other agents, such as parents. For example, they point out that
while the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) class size
experiment may have manipulated class size exogenously, parents were free to
adjust their own effort. Fredriksson et al. (2014) provide a concrete example of such
reactions. For another example, Das et al. (2013) present evidence from Africa and
India suggesting that parents respond to their children’s school receiving grants by
reducing their own financial contributions.
The result is that experiments may actually reveal a ‘‘policy effect’’ that includes
such parental responses:
dh2=d s2  s2ð Þ ¼ dh2=ds2 ¼ of2=os2 þ of2=op2  op2=o s2  s2ð Þ: ð6Þ
In other words, the difference between this estimate and that in Eq. (5) is that this
estimate also contains the indirect behavioral response coming from parents.
From a policy perspective, this is still a useful estimate of the effect of providing
a certain input. At the same time, it begins to raise some questions about conducting
policy using experiments. For example, cost-benefit calculations might require
ascertaining the relative contributions of school and family inputs. In addition,
although in the present framework the behavioral response by parents is
instantaneous, in real-world situations it might take time for parents to notice and
react to changes in school inputs.15 As a result, the estimated policy effect denoted
in Eq. (6) could vary with the time at which achievement is measured.
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) raise a further complication. Recall that s2 is a
vector of different school investments. To make things explicit, suppose there are
two inputs: sx2 and s
y
2. A randomized experiment might be able to vary one of these,
while controlling the level of the other. In that case, the resulting impact will still
resemble Eq. (6). For example, Duflo et al. (2011) manipulate the peer quality of the
classes children have access to, say sx2, while at the same time constraining changes
to other school inputs (e.g., teachers are randomly assigned to high- or low-
achievement classes).
Now suppose the increase in sx2 originates not in an experiment but from an
extensive and sustained policy. In such cases not just parents but the school system
will have a chance to react, and the total effect is:
15 For example, in Das et al. (2013) the response varies with parents’ information sets in a way that is
intuitive. When the grants schools receive are unexpected, parents do not adjust their behavior; when they
are expected, they do.
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which differs from Eq. (6) in also including responses within the school system.
Such responses, which Pop-Eleches and Urquiola refer to as ‘‘equilibrium
effects’’, may only emerge once interventions are taken to scale and sustained for a
period of time.16 For example, if tracking is sustained, more experienced teachers
may sort toward the higher achievement classes, and their ability to do so may
gradually become enshrined in norms or even union contracts.
To summarize, Todd and Wolpin (2003) make a useful distinction between
production function parameters (Eq. 3) and policy effects (Eq. 6). This raises some
complications, but experiments can still provide at least rough guidance on both.
Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) further emphasize that policy effects might be
different in situations where behavioral responses take time to unfold, or where
these responses only appear when certain interventions reach a certain scale—
Eq. (6) versus Eq. (7).
This matters because behavioral responses and equilibrium effects may limit the
ability of extensive experimentation to deliver evidence-based policy. The basic
argument is that, essentially by design, experimental research deals with small-scale
intervention. For example, the very fact that a control group must be constructed
requires some constraint on the scale of implementation. Further, some agents such
as parents or teachers may not be given time to react, or such reactions may be
deliberately precluded to identify the causal effect of a school input. Exercises such
as Dhaliwal et al. (2011) deliver a ranking of interventions under these conditions,
but the ranking may change as interventions are taken to scale or sustained.
4.5.3 Long-term effects
A related challenge arises because the effects of different inputs—whether these
arise from direct effects or from behavioral responses—may only be observed in the
long run. In the case of class size, for example, the STAR experiment highlights a
situation in which early effects on test scores faded out by higher grades, yet effects
on college attendance emerge later in life (Schanzenbach 2007).
5 Preschool inputs
While evidence has increased substantially on the effect of inputs in K-12
schooling—s2 in the framework of Sect. 2—there has been less work identifying the
causal impact of inputs on preschool outcomes: the effect of s1 on h1. There is
casual evidence that nutritional and other interventions during the preschool period
can have a significant impact on developing skills, both in developed countries
16 One could complicate Eq. (7) further and have s2
x and s2
y responding further to parental inputs. This is
one reason these are labeled equilibrium effects. See, for example, the discussions in Banerjee and Duflo
(2008), Acemoglu (2010), and Deaton (2010).
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(Currie and Thomas 1995; Ludwig and Miller 2007; Heckman et al. 2012) and
developing countries (Grantham-McGregor et al. 1994; Behrman et al. 2009;
Attanasio et al. 2012). That said, there has been less work that focuses on specific
inputs and mechanisms.
As discussed in Sect. 2, further examination of the preschool period raises a host
of issues in terms of designing policy. For example, it brings into focus the question
of relative productivities—at what time does an intervention via, say, public
provision of preschool inputs, best help disadvantaged children? For another
example, Cunha and Heckman (2007) show that once one allows for skill levels to
be the product of investments during multiple periods, the information one would
ideally want to formulate policy grows significantly. They point out that such
considerations may help explain the higher productivity of investments in
disadvantaged young children relative to productivity of investments in those same
children when they are older. If at a later period of a child’s life the child’s skill
level is low, the productivity of inputs directed toward raising those skills may also
be lower.
Thus, in addition to establishing the impact of inputs on the development of skills
in preschool, exploring the existence and magnitude of complementarities is an
important topic for research. If complementarities are small, then the precise period
in which children receive investments (say period 1 or 2 in the framework in
Sect. 2) is not crucial. But if they are large, then the period of investment is indeed
important. This is a challenging avenue of research. For an interesting example,
Aizer and Cunha (2012) present evidence on these issues while acknowledging the
substantial challenges involving both data (human capital is rarely measured at
multiple points in children’s life) and identification (human capital investments by
parents are endogenous).
6 Parental inputs
While it has long been recognized that the impact of parental inputs may be crucial
to skill development—if only because parents have the most contact with children
early on—there is much less well-identified evidence of the actual effect of those
inputs. This reflects, among other factors, the fact that it is difficult to
experimentally manipulate parental activities. Nevertheless, there is work on how
the home environment affects outcomes for school children (Carneiro et al. 2012).
There are also emerging but salient examples of experimental work. For example,
Attanasio et al. (2012, 2013) report on a randomized study in Colombia that changes
children’s nutritional intake at home, and also tries to manipulate the way children’s
parents relate to them. The intervention consists of two components: nutrition and
stimulation. The nutritional component provides ‘‘sprinkles’’ that parents can
dissolve into food and provide vitamins and minerals. The stimulation component
consists of weekly sessions by a home visitor who shows a child’s mother different
types of activities (e.g., songs, rhymes, and games with puzzles and toys) with
which she can engage the child. The visitor encourages the mother to participate in
these activities with the child during the following week.
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A notable aspect of this study is that it was designed with scalability in mind. The
sprinkles, for example, are inexpensive and easy to procure. The stimulation
training for the mother is carried out by ‘‘lead mothers’’ (madres lideres) selected
via Colombia’s ‘‘Families in Action’’ (Familias en Accion) Program, which is the
country’s main conditional cash transfer mechanism. These women have commu-
nity leadership roles in Families in Action but otherwise have received only the
relatively brief training provided by the program. An academic paper is not yet
available on this work, but preliminary results suggest that the stimulation
component had significant positive effects on a range of outcomes relevant to
cognitive language and motor development, sociability, and inhibitory control.
There is also little work on parental inputs at later educational stages, although,
as reviewed above, some recent work explores how different types of parental
participation respond to changes in the supply of school inputs. The bottom line is
that better understanding of the supply and impact of parental inputs seems like a
worthwhile focus for future research.
7 Incentives17
7.1 School choice and competition
As the previous sections make clear, education economists have been interested in
the effect of school inputs on educational achievement. The combination of these
two concepts has naturally led parts of the research agenda to focus on the concept
of school productivity. Hoxby (2002) provides a useful definition of productivity: a
school that is more productive is one that produces higher achievement per dollar
spent.
One reason to focus on productivity is that many school systems have
experienced declines in productivity, at least when measured with test scores as
an outcome. For example, Hanushek (1996) describes such a productivity decline in
US schools—greater expenditure with no test score improvement—and Pritchett
(2003) suggests that this development is common among member of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Data restrictions make
it harder to make analogous statements about developing countries, but the prima
facie evidence is consistent with many of these countries also having increased real
expenditures with at best small test score gains to show for it.
An influential view in economics argues that the way to address this problem is to
enhance the incentives and competition faced by schools—essentially by strength-
ening the incentives and rewards captured by in the framework in Sect. 2. Friedman
(1962), for example, suggested that the State could subsidize schooling—perhaps
based on equity or efficiency considerations—while leaving the actual production of
schooling to the private sector, thereby strengthening incentives and accountability.
This general view on how to improve public service delivery is shared by the World
Bank (2004), which, while not necessarily advocating outright privatization of
17 This section draws on MacLeod and Urquiola (2013).
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schooling, calls for a greater level of accountability in schools that would emulate
the accountability observed in private markets.
Another reason to explore the potential advantages of private schooling is
because it is common in the developing world, although the reasons behind this
depend on the context. In urban areas in Chile, for example, more than 50 % of
children attend private schools. In such middle-income countries, private enrollment
rates typically are high if private schools are eligible for significant State subsidies.
In contrast, low-income countries sometimes see increased private schooling with
little State support, perhaps in response to a public supply that is barely functioning.
For example, Andrabi et al. (2008) note that by the end of the 1990s, nearly all
wealthy Pakistani children in urban areas, almost a third of wealthy rural children,
and close to 10 % of children in the poorest deciles nationally, were studying in
private schools. In another instance, Kremer and Muralidharan (2006) pointed out
that about 25 % of children in rural India have access to fee-charging private
schools. In settings like India and Pakistan, these are mainly for profit schools that
charge low tuition and operate at low cost by hiring young, single, untrained local
women as teachers and paying them significantly less than the certified teachers
more common in public schools.
The next section turns to the evidence on these issues from voucher programs.
We follow Epple et al. (2015) in making a distinction between small and large
voucher programs. They identify small programs as those that place significant
restrictions on who can receive vouchers. The most common restrictions involve
income or geography—for instance, vouchers may be made available only to low-
income children in a given municipality within a country. By large programs, they
mean those in which vouchers are distributed country-wide and with minimal
restrictions on the type of children who can use them.
A final note before proceeding to the evidence is that this area of research—unlike
those reviewed above—is one in which a disproportionate amount of work has been
focused on Latin America. This reflects the fact that Chile and Colombia provide
among the most salient examples of large and small voucher systems, respectively.
7.2 Small programs
The literature on small voucher programs most frequently asks if there is a
significant advantage in terms of the productivity of private schools. In general,
there is no consistent evidence of such an advantage. For example, Barrow and
Rouse (2009) conclude that the best research to date finds relatively small
achievement gains for students offered vouchers, most of which are not statistically
different from zero.18 The studies that lead to such conclusions are often based on
experimental designs. For example, New York City conducted an experiment in
18 See also Neal (2009). This finding is consistent with a broader literature on the effects of attending a
higher-achieving school or class on academic performance, even when these transfers occur within a
given (public or private) sector. Here again several papers find little or no effect (Cullen et al. 2005, 2006;
Clark 2010; Duflo et al. 2011; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011). Some papers find
positive effects (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2013; Jackson 2010), but no uniform pattern emerges. The
studies on general equilibrium effects similarly suggest mixed results.
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1997 that randomly allocated school choice vouchers to low-income students. The
research suggests that winning a voucher to attend a private school had a modest and
statistically insignificant impact on student learning, not just on average but across
the distribution of preexisting ability (Mayer et al. 2002; Krueger and Zhu 2004;
Bitler et al. 2013).19
There is analogous research in Latin America.20 For example, Angrist et al.
(2002, 2006) and Bettinger et al. (2008) look at Colombia. For context, from 1992 to
1997, Colombia operated a secondary school voucher program, a central goal of
which was to increase secondary (6th–11th grade) enrollment rates by using private
sector participation to ease public sector capacity constraints that mostly affected
the poor. As a result, the vouchers were targeted at entering 6th grade students who
resided in low-income neighborhoods, attended public school, and were accepted at
a participating private school.
The initiative was implemented at the municipal level, with the national
government covering about 80 % of its cost, and municipalities contributing the
remainder. Resource constraints at both governmental levels resulted in excess
demand in most jurisdictions. When this happened, the vouchers were generally
allocated via lotteries.
These lotteries make it feasible to estimate the causal effect of winning a voucher
to attend private school. Angrist et al. (2002, 2006) and Bettinger et al. (2008) find
that, in general, lottery winners have better academic and nonacademic outcomes
than lottery losers. This result holds both for achievement measured using
administrative data, and for outcomes (such as performance on standardized exams)
that the researchers themselves measured.
It should be noted that in terms of identifying whether there is an advantage in
private schools regarding test scores, the Colombian voucher experiment has a few
problems. First, the vouchers were renewable contingent on grade completion, and
thus the program included an incentive component—voucher winners faced a
stronger reward for doing well at school. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out that the
superior test performance of lottery winners was due to external incentives rather
than to their schools’ productivity in terms of testing. Second, both lottery winners
and losers tended to enroll in private schools, particularly in larger cities. Focusing
on Bogota and Cali, Angrist et al. (2002) point out that while about 94 % of lottery
winners attended a private school in the first year, so did 88 percent of the losers.
This is not surprising to the extent that high private enrollment rate in secondary
school was symptomatic of the very supply bottlenecks that the program was
implemented to address. Since the reduced-form estimates in these papers are based
19 Mayer et al. (2002) and Krueger and Zhu (2004) find positive effects for some subgroups, although the
conclusion depends on how subgroups are defined.
20 There is a large literature on private/public comparisons in developing countries that extends beyond
the case of Colombia covered in this subsection. As is the case in the United States, papers meet with
varying success in terms of establishing credible control groups. Some implement only cross-sectional
analyses, while others look for explicit sources of exogenous variation. For a review on several countries,
see Patrinos et al. (2009); for Latin America, see Somers et al. (2004); for Chile, see Bellei (2007) and
McEwan et al. (2008); for India, see Kingdon (1996); for Indonesia, see Newhouse and Beegle (2006);
and for Pakistan, see Das et al. (2006).
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on a comparison of lottery winners and losers, they in some cases measure a
‘‘private with incentives vs. private without incentives’’ effect, rather than the effect
of private vs. public schooling that the literature typically addresses. Finally, the
institutional setup implies that many voucher winners (who, again, would have used
private school even if they did not win the lottery) used the vouchers to ‘‘upgrade’’
to more expensive private schools. Thus, part of the effect of winning a lottery could
reflect the access to greater resources, as opposed to a true test productivity
difference.
7.3 Large programs
The studies discussed above can be described in economic terminology as taking a
‘‘partial equilibrium’’ approach in the sense of looking at relatively small
interventions—for instance, the distribution of vouchers to a small fraction of the
population. This type of work essentially seeks to identify what would happen if one
took a small number of children from public schools and transferred them to private
schools.
More generally, one would like to consider situations that explore the general
equilibrium effects of school choice—settings that give an idea of the consequences
of allowing a large number of private schools to enter the market, along with
allowing parents to use any of them. This is relevant because the magnitude of a
‘‘partial equilibrium’’ private advantage like that measured in Colombia may not be
stable with respect to the private sector’s market share. For example, Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006) and Bettinger et al. (2008) point out that if the private productivity
advantage originates in positive peer effects, then the magnitude of this advantage
may change with growth in the private sector. This in turn reflects the fact that the
composition of students in the private and public sector is likely to change with
private entry.
A useful setting to ask such questions is Chile. Specifically, in 1981 Chile
introduced a universal voucher scheme that resulted in a substantial increase in
enrollment in private schools.21 By 2009, about 57 % of all students nationwide
attended private schools, with voucher schools alone accounting for about 50 %.
The latter group combined with a public share of 44 % means that about 94 % of all
children attended effectively voucher-funded institutions.22
The analytical virtue of this reform is that it provides an example of a large-scale
introduction of competition; the main drawback is that the simultaneous nationwide
implementation makes it difficult to establish counterfactuals. As a result, most
studies have adopted quasi-experimental methodologies. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006)
apply a difference-in-differences approach to municipalities for the 1982–1996
period. They find that municipalities that experienced faster growth in private sector
market share show distinct signs of increasing stratification (with higher income
students in the public sector moving to private schools), but do not have higher test
scores or average years of schooling.
21 For further institutional details see McEwan and Carnoy (2000) and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009).
22 The ‘‘elite’’ unsubsidized private schools account for about 6 % of enrollments.
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Even setting identification issues aside, these estimates do not isolate the effects
of competition on productivity in the sense of Hoxby (2002). Many things were
changing for Chilean schools during this period, including the distribution of
students (and hence potential peer effects) and levels of funding.23 Taken at face
value, however, these findings suggest that competition had a modest effect on
average school productivity.24
This research must also be considered along with aggregate trends. If there is a
substantial private productivity advantage, then one would expect Chile’s relative
performance on national and international tests to have improved over the years in
which large numbers of children were transferred into the private sector.
Furthermore, one would expect Chile to outperform other countries with similar
levels of GDP per capita. However, neither of these expectations is supported by the
data for at least the first 25 years of the voucher program.
As Epple et al. (2015) point out, Chile’s recent performance on international
testing has been more favorable. This improvement has coincided with a further
expansion in private schooling. But it also coincides with more growth in GDP per
capita and educational expenditures, expansions in preschool enrollments, and
reforms to rules governing university admission. Thus, it is difficult to causally
assign this recent improvement to the voucher program.
To summarize, the evidence from developing countries suggests that large-scale
expansion of the private school sector leads to stratification,25 but there is less
evidence that it leads to substantial gains in average school productivity. This is
consistent with the lack of a systematic private school advantage referenced above,
and additionally suggests that the introduction of competition may not by itself have
a large impact on public school productivity.
7.4 School choice: further challenges
When it comes to improving school skills, school choice programs have proved
somewhat disappointing—the evidence is mixed but clearly not sufficient to consider
this a silver bullet (Epple et al. 2015). Going forward two questions for research are:
1. Why is it that the effects of school choice programs have proven smaller than
economists might expect?
23 The value of the school voucher fell significantly during the 1980s and grew substantially during the
1990s.
24 Auguste and Valenzuela (2006) and Gallego (2006) analyze cross-sectional data, using instruments for
the private market share. Auguste and Valenzuela use the distance to a nearby city, and Gallego uses the
density of priests per diocese (with the reasoning that this lowered the costs of Catholic schools). The
results from both papers differ from those of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) in that both find that private entry
results in higher achievement, and concur (in the case of Auguste and Valenzuela—Gallego does not
analyze the issue) in finding that it also leads to stratification. Again, however, a key issue is the validity
of the instrumental variables. It is possible, for example, that more motivated parents migrate toward
cities in search of better schools, or that priests were allocated to communities in a manner correlated with
characteristics (e.g., population density) that might affect educational achievement.
25 For other examples of school market liberalization leading to stratification see Bjorklund et al. (2005)
and Mbiti and Lucas (2009) for Sweden and Kenya, respectively.
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2. How can choice schemes be better designed in terms of generating skill
improvements?
Some recent theoretical and empirical studies attempt to make headway in this
direction. At the heart of them is the notion that school choice can only be expected
to deliver what parents want. In an interesting recent study, Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2013) address this issue while combining some elements of the
partial and general equilibrium approaches described above. Specifically, the
authors implement a project in which applicants for vouchers were first recruited in
a number of towns, with two lotteries carried out subsequently. First, some towns
were selected for distribution of vouchers. Second, within the towns selected for
treatment, some children were randomly selected to receive the vouchers. This
allows Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) to go beyond the usual comparison
(lottery-winning individuals versus lottery-losing ones) in most studies. As one
example, by comparing nonapplicants in towns that did not receive vouchers to
nonapplicants in towns that did, the authors can get a sense of negative effects on
children ‘‘left behind’’ in the public sector. In the study, the authors do not find
much evidence of such externalities.
Moving on to the results for the applicants, Muralidharan and Sundararaman
found that after 4 years of treatment, lottery winners did not have higher test scores
than losers in five of six subjects. Specifically, they found no effects in Telugu (the
local language), Maths, English, Science, or Social Studies; in contrast, they did find
significantly higher scores in Hindi. Two aspects are of note beyond these reduced-
form results. First, the results are generally consistent with a differential allocation
of instruction time: private schools seem to spend more time teaching Hindi than
other subjects; public schools essentially do not teach Hindi. Second, the results are
consistent with a productivity advantage for private schools, since these schools
have lower costs than the public schools the students transferred from.
However, some questions remain. The first is if the positive effects on Hindi are a
school effect. The paper argues this is the case, but they could also be a peer effect.
The private schools may offer greater exposure to the children of parents who value
Hindi, perhaps because they are from other parts of India, or because they live in
large cities, or because they speak it more at home. As a result, the voucher winners
might learn more Hindi as a result of being exposed to such children rather than
because the schools teach it. If the types of parents who use private schools are in
fixed supply (at least in the short or medium term), the partial versus the general
equilibrium effects of choice could once again differ.
A second issue is that the paper suggests that English as a medium of instruction
disrupts learning, that parents may not realize this is the case, and that intervention
may be warranted. But another possibility is that parents are aware of this but
willing to make the sacrifice, if for example, English has high labor market returns.
A broader point this illustrates is that choice is likely to produce more of what
parents want, and those skills may or may not be the ones along the dimensions of
what policymakers prefer. MacLeod and Urquiola (2012, 2015) address this issue
theoretically, and suggest that the impact of school choice programs—and any
observed private productivity advantage—is unlikely to be invariant with respect to
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how choice programs are designed. In their model, parents care about what schools
their children go to for two reasons: (1) schools/colleges produce value added,
enhancing human capital investment, and (2) schools/colleges serve as a signal of
unobserved ability.
MacLeod and Urquiola (2012, 2015) show that if this is the case, parents will
want schools with good reputations, as expected. The key, however, is that schools’
reputations depend not just on how good they are at teaching, but also on which
other students are using them. In these situations, for example, rational parents will
not always choose the high-value-added schools, and rational schools will not
always choose to compete on value added. These implications are consistent, for
example, with the well-identified empirical evidence that selective schools only
sometimes produce higher learning and value added (Clark 2010; Abdulkadiroglu
et al. 2011; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2013).
MacLeod and Urquiola (2013) suggest, for example, that a design in which
schools are forced to use lotteries in selecting students (as in Sweden’s voucher
scheme or the US charter school system) may raise school productivity more than a
design that allows private schools to easily turn away students, as does Chile’s
system. These are system design questions that are not easily analyzed via
experiments or quasi-experiments, but which may nonetheless be central to
successfully raising the production of skills.
7.5 Incentives for parents and students
In a similar vein, it may be that skill accumulation crucially depends on how system
design affects the incentives for student or parental effort. For example, it may be
that unless students are willing to study and learn, no amount of school inputs or
competition between schools will improve outputs (Bishop 2004). This raises the
possibility that research should prioritize learning about terms like qh2/qs2 and qh2/
qe2, and about how system design affects the incentives needed to encourage parents
and students to supply effort.
There is also experimental work in this area, through studies that provide rewards
for students who perform well. The results are somewhat mixed. For example,
Kremer et al. (2009) find positive effects of such rewards, while Li et al. (2010) find
little effect in China (unless rewards are combined with other interventions). The
mixed evidence in this area lines up with results from developed countries and other
educational levels (Angrist et al. 2009).
Rather than focusing on payments for test scores, MacLeod and Urquiola (2015)
present a model emphasizing that incentives for parental and student effort may
emerge from the link between educational and labor markets. There is emerging,
well-identified empirical evidence consistent with this possibility. For example,
Jensen (2010) finds that boys in the Dominican Republic are quite responsive to
information on the returns to a high school education. A randomized intervention on
this produced gains on the order of a quarter to a third of a year of schooling.
Nguyen (2008) finds qualitatively similar results for Madagascar. A concern with
these relatively early studies, however, is that the information provided may not
reflect the causal returns to schooling, let alone be informative about how these
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returns may vary with student characteristics. In the extreme, individuals might have
been reacting to misleading information.
In more recent work, Jensen (2012) and Oster and Millett (2011) present
situations in which ‘‘real world’’ information on job opportunities affects student
investment and behavior. For example, information on the availability of call center
employment in India (which is open mainly to young women) affects the probability
that girls remain in school.
MacLeod and Urquiola (2013) similarly suggest that the organization of the
school system may affect incentives and effort. For example, systems that generally
emphasize meritocratic transitions between educational levels (e.g., middle to high
school in Romania or high school to university in Chile or South Korea) may be
better placed to extract effort and high human capital investment from students and
parents. Again, recent research on the economics of education—by placing very
high priority on identification and micro-studies—may be paying insufficient
attention to these ‘‘big’’ design questions.
7.6 Teacher incentives
Another area where the impact of incentives has been explored concerns teacher
behavior. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) find positive effects of teacher
performance pay on student learning outcomes. Glewwe et al. (2010) find analogous
effects in Kenya, but the impact is focused on incentivized exams. This is similar to
findings in the United States. Although not looking directly at the production of
skills, Duflo et al. (2012) find that monitoring in the form of pictures/time stamps
improved teacher attendance.
There has also been work on the use of contract teachers—instructors who are not
hired into normal civil service positions and are generally paid substantially less. In
his review of this work, McEwan (2013) points out that the effects here are
generally positive. An analytical complication, however, is that the effects are often
combined with other treatments such as class size reductions (Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2010; Duflo et al. 2011; Bold et al. 2013), which makes it difficult to
isolate the effect of contract teachers.
Three notes are warranted regarding the applications of such findings to Latin
America. First, although in many countries of the region contract teachers are rare,
they are more common in some of the lower income areas where there are contract
teachers (maestros interinos) who are sometimes hired locally by parent associa-
tions. Second, although absenteeism problems seem to be less severe in Latin
America than in Africa or India, they are certainly not irrelevant, and so these
interventions may have significant returns. Third, this is also an area where the
equilibrium effect may be quite relevant. For example, in the short run it may be
possible to increase teachers’ attendance by monitoring them with cameras, or by
having the flexibility to substitute regular teachers with contract teachers. Over time
such policies may have unintended effects. To illustrate, using cameras to force
teachers to show up to work amounts to a reduction in real wages. A significant
proportion of teachers might have signed up for work in remote locations with the
expectation that they only needed to show up 3 or 4 days a week, leaving the other 1
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or 2 days for travel to a larger town. If they find that the attendance policy is
enforced beyond an experiment, higher nominal wages may be necessary to attract
comparable teachers to remote locations.
Finally, while this discussion has treated incentives for students and for teachers
separately, recent work finds that there may be important interactions between them.
Specifically, Behrman et al. (2015) consider an experiment that provided test-based
incentives for: (1) students, (2) teachers, and (3) students, teachers, and school
administrators. They find that the third intervention produced the largest effects,
while the second had no impacts. Exploring such interactions may be an important
avenue for future research.
8 Conclusion
Producing an evidence-based policy outline for how educational systems might
better produce and improve skills is not a simple task. Nevertheless, research has
made substantial advances in this direction. In particular, the past decades have seen
progress in terms of data availability and the credible estimation of the causal
effects of given educational inputs.
These results provide an initial impression of what an evidence-based policy might
look like. For example, McEwan (2013) reviews a large number of experiments and
concludes that the most promising interventions are found in instructional materials,
computers or instructional technology, teacher training, smaller classes, smaller
learning groups within classes, ability grouping, student and teacher incentives, and
contract or volunteer teachers. In contrast, he finds less impact from monetary grants,
deworming, providing information to parents, and improving school management and
supervision. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) look at a different set of interventions, but go a step
further by incorporating cost information and ranking alternatives based on cost-
effectiveness comparisons. The type of careful evaluation work these reviews are
based on is desirable and should be sustained, if only because many relatively
expensive input initiatives in Latin America are still designed and implemented
without much reference to planning for evaluation.
There is a need for analogous research on the impact of educational inputs at the
preschool stage. Such work is less common, but may be quite important if part of
the return to preschool investments comes in the form of a greater return to
investments at later stages of a child’s life. In this case, properly quantifying the
impact of preschool interventions may be quite valuable.
Despite such progress, there are likely limits to the extent to which experimental
and quasi-experimental evaluations—and reviews like those in Dhaliwal et al.
(2011)—can guide policy. One key issue here is that the rankings that emerge may not
be stable across or even within countries. For instance, they may vary with the setting
and/or scale of implementation. This reflects issues related to external validity and
equilibrium effects and suggests that caution in implementation is warranted.
Further progress on understanding the effects of incentives would be valuable.
For example, there has been significant work on the effects of introducing
competition in school systems. In general, the effects of voucher and similar
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:12 Page 25 of 30 12
123
initiatives have not been nearly as robust or positive as many economists expected.
The key challenge in this area is to understand what accounts for this
disappointment, and what this implies regarding how programs might be better
designed. The bottom line is that while the evidence is not sufficient to warrant
widespread adoption of such initiatives, it certainly points to the desirability of
continued experimentation.
Additional research on the impact and determinants of parental and student effort is
also desirable. For example, the returns to skills in the labor market, or in admission to
universities, may be crucial in terms of determining parents’ and students’ attitudes
toward skill accumulation. A corollary is that the organization of the educational
market, and its relation with the labor market, may involve a broad set of institutions
that sets an educational system up for either success or failure. If this is the case, then
understanding these incentives is not only desirable in and of itself, but may be
important to correctly exploit all the knowledge gained from experimentation.
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